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Abstract 
The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by 
potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both case-
study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in 
this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is 
likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the 
period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and 
the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector 
because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence 
shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain. 
 
JEL Classification: D73, L74 
Key words: Corruption, Construction Sector, Empirical Estimates, Reverse Causality  
  
2 
 
Construction Corrupts: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of 42 Countries 
1. Introduction  
Corruption or the abuse of public office for public gain is bad for society. Among its 
mainy ills, economists have reported that corruption tends to reduce economic growth 
(Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001), increase income and 
educational inequalities (Gupta et al. 2002), reduce spending on health and education 
(Mauro 1998; Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2001) and enlarge the underground 
economy thus reducing government revenues (Johnson et al. 1998).  
Because of the negative impact of corruption on desirable socio-economic objectives, 
social scientists have attempted to identify those factors which drive corruption. These 
include economic conditions such as the level of economic development (Treisman 
2000) and inter-personal income inequalities (You and Khagram 2005), political factors 
such as the level of democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and electoral rules (Persson 
et al. 2003), and cultural factors (Fisman and Miguel 2007) which have been linked to 
religion (La Porta et al. 1999).
1
   
Several authors have identified the pernicious effect of natural resources on governance. 
The natural resource sector is one characterized by state regulation and large rents and 
profits which result in part due to limited competition (Ades and Di Tella 1999). This 
combination of rents and regulation creates opportunities for corrupt behavior by public 
officials leading to a “resource curse” such that natural resources, by increasing 
corruption tend to reduce rather than increase economic growth (Leite and Weidmann 
2002; Busse and Gröning 2013; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013).  
Inspired by this literature, in this article we turn to another sector of the economy – the 
construction sector – which is similarly characterized by relatively high value 
investments and significant government interactions and regulation thus providing 
opportunities for corrupt public officials (Transparency International 2011). The 
construction market in most countries is split between a competitive segment composed 
of large number of small contractors and an oligopolistic, often cartelized tranche, made 
up of a limited number of firms handling the larger construction projects (OECD 2008; 
Kenny 2009). The sector includes construction projects, both public and privately 
financed, and government intervention can take several forms the most obvious being 
public tenders to undertake public investment projects and local government zoning or 
town planning decisions which affect the construction of private housing.  
In line with empirical work exploring the impact of natural resources on governance, we 
posit that countries with larger construction sectors, both in terms of volume and as a 
percentage of Gross Value Added (GVA), are likely to suffer from more corruption. We 
explore this by way of an unbalanced panel of 42 mostly middle and high income 
                                                          
1
 See Lambsdorff (2007) for an extensive – book length – review of both the causes and 
consequences of corruption.  
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countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We find that the greater importance of the 
construction sector tends to worsen corruption even after controlling for a range of 
potentially confounding variables and the real possibility that corrupt officials may 
promote the development of the construction sector since it increases the resources 
appropriable by them.  
This article is structured as follows. In the next section we review that work which has 
considered the relationship between the construction industry and corruption. We then 
present how we measure our key variables and explain our empirical approach. Finally, 
we report and discuss our main empirical findings before concluding the article. 
2. Construction and corruption: existing evidence 
According to one estimate, corruption in the construction industry accounts for an 
estimated $340 billion of worldwide construction costs each year, representing 10% of 
the global construction market value (ASCE 2004). Corruption in the industry leads to 
cost overuns, poor quality construction, inefficient project selection and deficient 
maintainence (Kenny 2006 and 2009). Corruption in public construction projects is 
particularly damaging for developing countries with important infraestructural 
deficiencies and scarce resources (Transparency International 2011).  
The structure of the construction industry across countries speaks to the availability of 
large rents which can fuel corruption. National construction sectors are mainly 
characterized by the presence of a limited number of large firms which have the 
capacity to undertake large construction projects. Perhaps not surprisingly then, 
competition in the construction industry tends to be limited with anti-competitive 
practices occurring frequently mostly in the guise of collusive agreements between 
firms. The OECD (2008) documents a series of high profile examples of collusion 
which were brought to light in the period 1997-2007 in several countries including, 
Turkey, South Korea, Japan,  the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. This 
collusion takes several forms including bid rigging, sales restrictions, price fixing and 
market allocation deals.  
A range of qualitative, mostly, country case studies have considered the nature of 
corruption in the construction industry (see, Le et al. 2014 for a survey). Corruption can 
occur at any stage of a construction project, from planning and design, bidding and 
construction and operation and maintenance. It can manifest itself in many related forms 
including bribing public officials involved in key decisions affecting private and public 
construction projects, bid rigging by public administrators to ensure that a favored 
tenderor wins the project, or even the extortion of construction companies to extract 
bribes. And several factors have been identified as contributing towards corruption in 
the contstruction sector including, ethical preferences related to culture, innefective 
legal systems, insufficient transparency in tenders, asymmetric information among 
tenderees, difficulties in benchmarking for cost and time given the uniqueness of many 
construction projects, the practice of sub-contracting which makes the tracing of 
payments and the diffusion of standards of practice more complex and, finally, the 
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major role of government as “clients, regulators, and owners” of construction 
companies (see also, Sohail and Cavill 2008 and Kenny 2009).  
The positive association of the construction sector and corruption (both that involving 
public officials and that between private agents) has been picked up by several surveys. 
Since 1999, Transparency International’s Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) has reported 
company executives’ perceptions of the likelihood that companies from twenty eight 
leading countries (the G-20 plus eight) to win business abroad by paying bribes 
(Transparency International 2011). The executives surveyed by Transparency 
International consider that companies working in the public works and construction 
sector are the ones most likely to bribe to obtain contracts. Moreover, the BPI finds that 
those countries whose companies are more likely to pay bribes abroad are also the ones 
with higher levels of perceived corruption at home. The positive association between 
the construction sector and corruption abroad has been reported by the OECD based on 
actual corruption cases brought to light (OECD 2014). Of the 427 cases of corruption of 
public officials between 1999 and 2014, the OECD found that companies from the 
extractive industries were most likely to corrupt followed closely by those in the 
construction and transportation and storage sectors.
2
 
Despite the existence of numerous country case-studies and survey evidence indicating 
the possible adverse effects of the construction industry on corruption, to our knowledge 
this relationship has not received any systematic empirical attention. Instead, authors 
have made some attempt to examine the extent to which corruption can affect the 
development of the construction sector and, more generally, the composition of public 
expenditures. The point of departure of this line of work is Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
who argue that corrupt governments will tend to favor infrastructure and defense 
projects where corruption opportunities are abundant (compared to spending on say, 
education and health). The empirical evidence is largely supportive of this since corrupt 
countries tend to overinvest in public infraestructures which moreover are of lower 
quality (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), spend more on defense (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 
2001) and less on education (Mauro 1997 and 1998). More recently, Liu and Mikesell 
(2014) draw on evidence across U.S. states and report that corruption increases 
spending in public construction projects and reduces spending on education and health. 
This work is important in its own right but for our purpose it alerts us to the likelihood 
that the direction of causality between corruption and construction runs both ways. We 
describe how we deal with this issue in the next section.  
3. Data and empirical method  
Our measure of the construction sector is the ratio of gross value added (GVA) of the 
construction sector on total GVA and comes from the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD) Socio-economic Accounts (SEA), a source that provides industry-level time-
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 Kenny (2009) reports additional survey-based evidence of a strong association between 
corruption and the construction sector from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) which covers over 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries. 
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series on employment, capital stocks, gross output and value added at current and 
constant prices using the same industry classification as for the world input-output 
tables.3 The WIOD covers 40 countries for the period from 1995 to 2011. Specifically, 
the WIOD-SEA provides data on gross value added of the economy disaggregated for 
35 industries, including the contruction industry. We expand our sample using data 
from the OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis and following the same 
methodology with regards to the elaboration of the construction variable. Our final 
sample comprises 27 EU countries (Croatia is not inluded), 3 other European countries 
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), also Russia, Turkey and 4 Asian countries (India, 
Indonesia South Korea and Japan), 4 American countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico and 
USA) and Australia and New Zealand (see Table A.1 in the appendix). 
Additionally, we propose to measure the importance of construction by multiplying the 
previous variable by country GDP (in logs). The reason for this is to take into account 
not just the weight or relative size of the sector in the economy but also to reflect upon 
the amount of resources involved. Doing so can capture the possibility that during an 
economic expansion (contraction), the weight of contruction in the economy may 
remain stable but the amount of resources and thus rents generated by the sector may 
experience a significant increase (decrease) something which may have a bearing on 
corruption.
4
 For instance, Slovenia (1997), Portugal (1998), the Netherlands (1999) and 
Sweden (2000) grew almost 5 per cent (during the specified year) while the ratio of 
construction remained very stable. Alternatively, the Baltic countries experienced a very 
strong economic crisis in 2009 (with GDP reductions above 10%), but at the same time 
the share of construction in GVA remained constant. Consequently, just considereding 
the relative size of the construction sector would not necessarily capture the volume of 
resources employed, something which is likely to have an incidence on the extent of 
corruption in this sector. Using this alternative measure of the construction industry is 
also a useful robustness test since the simple correlation between it and construction as 
a percentage of GVA is a mere -0.021 (see Table A.2 in the appendix for the summary 
statistics and Table A.3 for the correlation matrix). 
To measure corruption we rely on the World Governance Indicators (WGI). Specifically 
we employ the Control of Corruption measure from this source which measures 
“perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2010). This indicator has been widely used in 
research empirically calibrating the causes and consequences of corruption. Like all the 
other governance dimensions it varies between -2.5 and 2.5 and higher values reflect 
                                                          
3
 These tables are constructed on the basis of officially published input-output tables in 
conjunction with national accounts and international trade statistics. Timmer (2012) provides an 
overview of the contents, sources and methods used in compiling the World Input-Output 
Database. 
4
 In this relation, Jiménez (2009) describes how the building boom in Spain fuelled political 
corruption there. 
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less perceived corruption. In our sample of countries perceived corruption is highest in 
Russia, Indonesia and India while it is lowest in Scandinavia and New Zealand.     
As a first step in empirically examining the relationship between the construction sector 
and corruption we plot the Control of Corruption measure against our two construction 
sector indicators. To simplify the figures we use average values for each variable over 
the sample period (1995-2011). The figures are suggestive of a negative association 
between Control of Corruption and the construction sector or, in other words, a larger 
sector is associated with greater corruption. Figure 1 shows that the construction sector 
is relatively small (compared to other sectors) in countries like Malta, New Zealand, 
Hungary and Norway while it accounts for a larger part of gross value added in Spain, 
Iceland, Cyprus and South Korea. A slightly different picture emerges from figure 2 
which plots the corruption measure against the indicator aimed at capturing the volume 
of resources employed in the construction sector. Now Spain, South Korea, Japan and 
India have larger construction sectors. The size of the U.S construction sector also looks 
larger from this perspective. While the two figures are suggestive of a negative 
association between clean government and construction, they are of course silent on 
both the counfounding influence of other factors as well as the direction of causality. In 
what remains in this section we explain how we address these two important concerns.  
 
 
Figure 1. Control of Corruption and Construction as a % of GVA (average values over the 
period 1995-2011). 
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Figure 2. Control of Corruption and Construction Sector Volume (average values over the 
period 1995-2011). 
We estimate the following model:  
Control of Corruptionit = αi + α1 Constructionit + α2 Xit +εit         (1) 
where i refers to countries and t to years, αi is a constant, Xit is the vector of control 
variables and εit is the error term. Given our previous discussion we expect α1<0. Since 
we have substantially more cross-section units than time periods, we follow Beck and 
Katz (1995) and estimate the model using OLS with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) employing cross-section clustering or a covariance structure which computes 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation between the 
residuals for a given cross-section (Period SUR). Because the limited within country 
variation of the Control of Corruption measure in our sample (see, Table A.2 in the 
appendix) we do not apply cross-section fixed effects (see, Baltagi 2013). Alternatively, 
we do introduce period fixed effects to account for the influence of unknown or 
unobservable time variant factors affecting all our cross-section units.  
Our set of control variables is chosen so as to minimize omitted variable bias and as 
such is potentially associated with both corruption and the size of the construction 
sector. In particular we control for the logarithm of real GDP per capita, a country’s 
population (in logs), public sector size, the openness of the economy, the importance of 
the oil and mining sectors (all as a percentage of GDP), a measure of inter-personal 
inequalities (Gini based on disposable income), the extent to which local governments 
have fiscal and political autonomy and legal origins.  
The link between economic development and corruption has been argued from both the 
supply and demand sides of the political market place: wealthier countries may be able 
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to afford better quality public institutions and the citizens of these countries countries 
may – by virtue of higher education levels – be more demanding with respect to clean 
and efficient government (Islam and Montenegro 2002; Treisman 2007). Accounting for 
the level of development also allows us to control for the possibility that the relative 
importance of different economic sectors may vary with income (Imbs and Wacziarg 
2003) as well as the expectation that the demand for both private and public 
construction may increase with income. We moreover, contol for population since more 
populous countries may be more difficult to govern (Treisman 2002) or may enjoy 
economies of scale in the fight against corruption (Knack and Azfar 2003). Like the 
case of income, the evolution of population over time is likely to have an incidence on 
the demand for private and public construction. The need to control for the size of the 
public sector is due to the fact that a bigger public sector offers greater opportunities for 
rents and thus corruption (Tanzi 1998) and because the resources available to the state 
may determine its capacity to undertake public construction projects.  
Given our previous discussion we also account for the importance of natural resources 
in a country’s gross domestic product since this determines the availability of rents 
which may be captured by corrupt officials. The availability of rents also depends on the 
degree of openness of the economy since competition from foreign firms will tend to 
reduce the rents enjoyed by domestic firms and hence the rewards from corruption 
(Ades and di Tella 1999). Controlling for the natural resource industry and country 
openness is also justified because both are likely to affect the sectoral specialization of 
the economy and thus, the relative size of the construction sector.  
Because inter-personal income inequalities have been identified as potential 
determinants of corruption we also control for them (You and Khagram 2005; Uslaner 
2010). Income inequalities may, moreover, have an incidence on the size of the 
construction sector either because they affect the capacity of individuals to purchase 
housing in the private sector or because they impact on the demand for public services 
which may imply public construction. We moreover control for the independence of 
local governments from higher level governments control. Specifically, we control for 
the degree of fiscal and political autonomy enjoyed by local governments (Ivanyna and 
Shah 2014). Previous work has reported that a greater dependence on ones own fiscal 
resources tends to reduce corruption because inter-jurisdictional competition for tax 
base disciplines subnational governments while the election rather than appointment of 
local politicians has been related to greater corruption possibly because the proximity of 
public officials increases the likelihood of their capture by special interests (Kyriacou 
and Roca-Sagalés 2011a and 2011b). Controlling for local government’s autonomy is 
also warranted by the fact that local government decisions – for example the 
classification of land as subject to building or not and the concession of building 
permits – affect the construction of new housing (see, for example, Wollman 2008 and 
Jimenez 2009).  
Finally, we control for legal origins since scholars have associated them with both 
corruption and a set of variables capturing the nature of financial institutions and which, 
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as a result, can potentially have an incidence on the development of the construction 
sector. In particular, it has been argued that the depth and scope of state intervention – 
and thus possibilities for corruption – will tend to be greatest in countries with a Soviet 
legal tradition, lower in ones with a tradition of civil law (represented by the French, 
German and Scandinavian civil codes) and lowest in countries with common law 
systems (La Porta el al. 1999). Moreover, legal traditions have been linked to the key 
features of financial institutions including the degree of shareholder and creditor 
protection, the efficiency of debt enforcement and government ownership of banks (for 
a summary of the findings, La Porta el al. 2008). Legal origins have also been linked to 
the regulation of entry of new firms to the economy and from there to the size of 
unofficial economies (Djankov et al. 2002). To the extent that either of these variables 
may affect the relationship between corruption and the construction sector, then legal 
origin helps us to control for their confounding effect.
 5
  
A major concern when trying to identify the relationship between construction and 
corruption is the presence of reverse causality. While the construction sector may 
worsen corruption, it could also be the case that officials in more corrupt countries may 
adopt policies which will tend to favor the construction sector to the detriment of other 
economic sectors which do not provide similar opportunities for appropriating rents. 
Not accounting for this feedback effect is likely to generate point estimates of the 
impact of construction on corruption which are downward biased (since a greater 
control of corruption is likely to be associated with a smaller construction sector).  
To deal with this issue we resort to two stage least squares estimation where we 
instrument our measures of the construction industry with the percentage of population 
between 25 and 49 years of age because individuals within this age range are more 
likely to demand housing while those below this range may still be living with their 
parents or renting while those above this age group may have already bought a house. 
We would argue that this demographic based variable satisfies the conditions expected 
of a good instrument (Murray 2006). First, there is no apriori reason why the level of 
corruption in a country should affect its demographic structure in general or this age 
cohort in particular. Second, we think it is reasonable to argue that the impact of this 
particular age cohort on corruption be transmitted through our measures of construction 
or, at least, that the possibility of any other indirect impact be reduced by our chosen set 
of control variables (the exclusion restriction). To this effect, the link between age 
cohorts and housing demand has been explored by work studying the impact of the baby 
boom on the housing market (Jafee et al. 1979; Mankiw and Weil 1989). Finally, our 
instrument is a strong one as attested by the F-statistics from the first stage of the two-
step procedure which are always above the critical value of 10 recommended by Staiger 
and Stock (1997). 
 
                                                          
5
 Unfortunately data on the importance of the informal economy (Schneider et al. 2010 and 
Schneider and Buehn 2013) is not available for our sample of countries and years.  
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents our OLS regressions of control of corruption on the measures of the 
construction sector and the control variables. Columns 1 to 3 employ the share of 
construction in GVA while the last three columns show the results when using the 
alternative measure of the construction sector taking into account the volume of 
resources. We employ both contemporaneous values of construction (columns 1 and 4) 
and values taking one and two period lags based on the expectation that corruption in 
this sector may take some time to affect perceptions (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). The results 
indicate that construction is negatively associated with control of corruption at 
statistically significant levels. Both the estimated impact of construction and its 
statistical significance improve when using lagged valued lending some support to the 
idea that corruption in this sector in any year may be better captured by corruption 
perceptions corresponding to later years.  
The estimated impact of the control variables is in line with that found in previous 
studies. Focusing on the statistically significant findings, the results indicates that the 
level of income and the degree of fiscal autonomy of municipal governments are 
positively associated with control of corruption, while the latter is negatively related to 
the political autonomy of local governments, the relative importance of natural 
resources and french and soviet legal origins (compared to having a British common 
law tradition). The results also indicate that a larger population tends to be associated 
with more corruption lending some support to the suggestion that smaller countries are 
better goverened, although this finding is not robust across all specifications.    
In table 2 we report the same regressions but based on TSLS and employing our chosen 
demographic instrumental variable namely, the percentage of population between 25 
and 49 years of age. Compared to the OLS regressions, both the estimated impact and 
statistical significance of the construction sector on corruption are higher. This is 
consistent with the presence of reverse causality in the OLS estimates – recall that this 
effect, if present, should reduce the point estimate on construction. In table 2 we, 
moreover, report the F-statistics of the first stage regressions which, again, are always 
above the critical value of 10 thus pointing to the strength of the instrument. The 
estimated impact of construction on corruption is economically significant. Focusing on 
the results in the first column of table 2, a one standard deviation increase in 
construction as a share of GVA, reduces the control of corruption measure by 0.306 
points or around 32 per cent of a standard deviation in the control of corruption index. 
By way of illustration, consider South Korea and Belgium. Focusing on average values 
over the sample period, Korea’s and Belgium’s construction sectors represent, 
respectively, 7.828  and 5.037 per cent of total Gross Value Added while the 
corresponding Control of Corruption scores are 0.403 and 1.382 respectively. Our 
empirical analysis implies that almost 31 per cent of the corruption gap between South 
Korea and Belgium can be explained by the larger weight of the construction sector in 
the former.   
11 
 
Table 1. The impact of Construction on Control of Corruption (OLS)   
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
One lag 
(3) 
Two lags 
(4) 
 
(5) 
One lag 
 
(6) 
Two lags 
 
Construction (% GVA) 
-0.048* 
(0.026) 
-0.054** 
(0.026) 
-0.061*** 
(0.027) 
-- -- -- 
(Log of GDP) *Construction -- -- -- 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.670*** 
(0.115) 
0.675*** 
(0.115) 
0.674*** 
(0.114) 
0.689*** 
(0.116) 
0.698*** 
(0.115) 
0.701*** 
(0.115) 
Log of Population 
-0.094** 
(0.047) 
-0.096** 
(0.046) 
-0.103** 
(0.046) 
-0.069 
(0.046) 
-0.068 
(0.045) 
-0.071 
(0.045) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.039*** 
(0.016) 
-0.039*** 
(0.016) 
-0.040*** 
(0.016) 
-0.038*** 
(0.016) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.040*** 
(0.016) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Inequality 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
Fiscal Decentralization 
0.824*** 
(0.302) 
0.826*** 
(0.299) 
0.849*** 
(0.004) 
0.829*** 
(0.301) 
0.830*** 
(0.298) 
0.854*** 
(0.295) 
Political Decentralization 
-1.207*** 
(0.446) 
-1.214*** 
(0.441) 
-1.254*** 
(0.436) 
-1.243*** 
(0.448) 
-1.254*** 
(0.443) 
-1.294*** 
(0.438) 
Legal French 
-0.668*** 
(0.142) 
-0.670*** 
(0.141) 
-0.657*** 
(0.141) 
-0.664*** 
(0.141) 
-0.666*** 
(0.140) 
-0.652*** 
(0.140) 
Legal German 
-0.322* 
(0.195) 
-0.312* 
(0.193) 
-0.283 
(0.191) 
-0.318* 
(0.194) 
-0.306 
(0.193) 
-0.276 
(0.191) 
Legal Scandinavian 
-0.074 
(0.227) 
-0.076 
(0.226) 
-0.060 
(0.224) 
-0.083 
(0.227) 
-0.086 
(0.225) 
-0.071 
(0.223) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.025*** 
(0.173) 
-1.025*** 
(0.172) 
-1.005*** 
(0.170) 
-1.030*** 
(0.172) 
-1.029*** 
(0.171) 
-1.008*** 
(0.170) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.869 0.870 0.875 0.869 0.870 0.875 
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and 
include period fixed effects. 
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Table 2. The impact of Construction on Control of Corruption (TSLS)   
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
One lag 
(3) 
Two lags 
(4) 
 
(5) 
One lag 
 
(6) 
Two lags 
 
Construction (% GVA) 
-0.189*** 
(0.077) 
-0.175*** 
(0.069) 
-0.187*** 
(0.065) 
-- -- -- 
(Log of GDP) *Construction -- -- -- 
-0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.646*** 
(0.119) 
0.668*** 
(0.117) 
0.667*** 
(0.116) 
0.716*** 
(0.119) 
0.737*** 
(0.118) 
0.746*** 
(0.118) 
Log of Population 
-0.154*** 
(0.057) 
-0.146*** 
(0.053) 
-0.153** 
(0.052) 
-0.059 
(0.047) 
-0.057 
(0.046) 
-0.058 
(0.046) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.052*** 
(0.018) 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
-0.051*** 
(0.017) 
-0.050*** 
(0.018) 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
Inequality 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Fiscal Decentralization 
0.709** 
(0.315) 
0.742*** 
(0.306) 
0.765*** 
(0.304) 
0.738*** 
(0.312) 
0.762*** 
(0.303) 
0.783*** 
(0.302) 
Political Decentralization 
-1.638*** 
(0.518) 
-1.559*** 
(0.490) 
-1.576*** 
(0.477) 
-1.722*** 
(0.532) 
-1.641*** 
(0.502) 
-1.671*** 
(0.487) 
Legal French 
-0.689*** 
(0.147) 
-0.689*** 
(0.144) 
-0.676*** 
(0.144) 
-0.673*** 
(0.145) 
-0.674*** 
(0.142) 
-0.660*** 
(0.142) 
Legal German 
-0.328* 
(0.200) 
-0.294 
(0.196) 
-0.264 
(0.195) 
-0.313 
(0.199) 
-0.278 
(0.195) 
-0.245 
(0.194) 
Legal Scandinavian 
-0.226 
(0.251) 
-0.198 
(0.241) 
-0.164 
(0.236) 
-0.243 
(0.251) 
-0.215 
(0.241) 
-0.188 
(0.236) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.022*** 
(0.179) 
-1.023*** 
(0.175) 
-1.004*** 
(0.174) 
-1.041*** 
(0.178) 
-1.035*** 
(0.174) 
-1.014*** 
(0.173) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.826 0.839 0.841 0.832 0.843 0.845 
F-statistic from first stage 11.374 11.091 11.574 15.335 15.508 15.635 
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and 
include period fixed effects. Construction is instrumented using the percentage of population between 25 and 49 
years old.  
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Table 3. Robustness Analysis (TSLS)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Construction (%  GVA) 
-0.179** 
(0.087) 
-- 
-0.202*** 
(0.082) 
-- 
-0.436*** 
(0.176) 
-- 
-0.206** 
(0.098) 
-- 
(Log of GDP) *construction -- 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-- 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-- 
-0.034*** 
(0.0136) 
-- 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.651*** 
(0.127) 
0.711*** 
(0.128) 
0.525*** 
(0.130) 
0.586*** 
(0.128) 
0.321 
(0.262) 
0.484* 
(0.258) 
0.607*** 
(0.147) 
0.682*** 
(0.143) 
Log of Population 
-0.106* 
(0.060) 
-0.016 
(0.059) 
-0.151*** 
(0.057) 
-0.050 
(0.049) 
-0.315*** 
(0.132) 
-0.095 
(0.106) 
-0.144** 
(0.067) 
-0.042 
(0.055) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.055*** 
(0.021) 
-0.052*** 
(0.021) 
-0.049*** 
(0.018) 
-0.045*** 
(0.017) 
-0.043 
(0.042) 
-0.037 
(0.040) 
-0.054*** 
(0.022) 
-0.051*** 
(0.021) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Inequality 
-0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Fiscal Decentralization -- -- 
0.491 
(0.332) 
0.505 
(0.327) 
1.452** 
(0.697) 
1.516** 
(0.684) 
0.697** 
(0.357) 
0.731** 
(0.351) 
Political Decentralization -- -- 
-1.759*** 
(0.607) 
-1.852*** 
(0.622) 
-2.242** 
(1.177) 
-2.431** 
(1.202) 
-1.704*** 
(0.601) 
-1.787*** 
(0.617) 
Decentralization Index 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Legal French 
-0.624*** 
(0.164) 
-0.605*** 
(0.165) 
-0.749*** 
(0.191) 
-0.733*** 
(0.185) 
-0.768*** 
(0.317) 
-0.731*** 
(0.311) 
-0.684*** 
(0.162) 
-0.663*** 
(0.160) 
Legal German 
-0.439* 
(0.234) 
-0.441* 
(0.236) 
-0.329* 
(0.194) 
-0.314* 
(0.191) 
-0.837** 
(0.440) 
-0.800* 
(0.434) 
-0.347 
(0.231) 
-0.327 
(0.228) 
Legal Scandinavian 
0.189 
(0.366) 
0.157 
(0.366) 
-0.388 
(0.311) 
-0.405 
(0.305) 
-0.340 
(0.562) 
-0.373 
(0.559) 
-0.319 
(0.305) 
-0.318 
(0.301) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.045*** 
(0.205) 
-1.067*** 
(0.207) 
-1.134*** 
(0.191) 
-1.167*** 
(0.191) 
-1.361*** 
(0.395) 
-1.404*** 
(0.389) 
-1.048*** 
(0.208) 
-1.062*** 
(0.206) 
Catholic 
-- -- 
0.420 
(0.334) 
0.433 
(0.331) 
-- -- -- -- 
Protestant 
-- -- 
0.479 
(0.507) 
0.472 
(0.500) 
-- -- -- -- 
Muslim 
-- -- 
-0.207 
(0.486) 
-0.299 
(0.479) 
-- -- -- -- 
Orthodox 
-- -- 
0.127 
(0.401) 
0.108 
(0.392) 
-- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2  0.793 0.794 0.825 0.833 0.514 0.529 0.792 0.800 
F-statistic from first stage 12.478 15.501 15.274 20.686 11.669 15.249 4.703 6.776 
Observations 479 479 479 479 473 473 137 137 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and 
include period fixed effects. Construction is instrumented using the percentage of population between 25 and 49 
years old. Regressions 7 and 8 employ five year means of all variables and all the time variant control variables are 
instrumented using initial period values.  
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We further pursue the robustness of our results in table 3 where, again, we employ 
TSLS. In columns 1 and 2 of this table we replace the measures of local fiscal and 
political decentralization with a more aggregate indicator also proposed by Ivanyna and 
Shah (2014). In addition to incorporating information on the degree of fiscal and 
political autonomy enjoyed by local governments, this more aggregate measure also 
includes information on their administrative autonomy (the share of local government 
employment in general government employment and the extent to which local 
governments can decide on human resources policy) and the security of existence of 
local governments (as measured by the constitutional and legal restraints on their 
arbitrary dismissal by higher level governments). This more aggregate measure, called 
Decentralization Index, is not associated with corruption at statistically significant 
levels which, perhaps, is as expected since it incorportates the notions of fiscal and 
political autonomy which relate to corruption in opposite ways. More importantly for 
our purposes here, our substantive results remain unchanged: we continue to find a 
negative and statistically significant impact of the construction sector on corruption.  
In columns 3 and 4 of the table we further control for the confounding influence of 
culture as captured by the size of different religions in a country. Several authors have 
related Protestantism with less corruption and Catholicsm, Islam and the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition with more corruption perhaps because the latter three are more 
hierarchical and, as such, inculcate values which make people less likely to challenge 
public office holders (La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000; North et al. 2013). 
Moreover, Guiso et al. (2003) report systematic differences between individuals from 
different religions across a range of economic attitudes on issues like tax evasion, public 
versus private ownership, the importance of luck and chance versus hard work for 
success,  the importance of thrift and whether competition is good or harmful. These 
attitudes could potentially have some incidence on both the demand and supply sides of 
the private and public construction markets thus justifying the need to control for 
different types of religions in our estimates. As shown in the table, these variables do 
not have a statistically significant impact in our sample while the estimated impact of 
construction is robust to their introduction.
6
 
Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 show the results when we employ an alternative measure of 
corruption namely, that provided by the Political Risk Services group in the context of 
their International Country Risk Guide. In our sample, this indicator varies between 1 
and 6, and higher values reflect a lower risk of corruption. The use of this indicator as 
the dependent variable does not change our results. Finally, in columns 7 and 8 we 
report the results of employing 5 year averages of the data. The significant change in the 
sample size acts as a further robustness check. Moreover, because our decentralization 
and legal origin indicators are constant over time, adopting this approach goes some 
way to account for the possibility that our panel results are being driven by repeated 
                                                          
6
 The measures of religion refer to the percentage of the population that can identified as 
belonging to a specific religion and come from North et al. (2013). 
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entries. Five year values also allow us to deal to some extent with the impact of reverse 
causality on all of our time variant explanatory variables. In particular we instrument 
these variables with their initial five-year period values. Finally, the use of five year 
averages also allow us to control somewhat for the business cycle and thus to focus on 
the structural relationship between the key variables of interest. As can be seen, 
employing five year averages does not change our substantive results and confirms the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients.  
5. Conclusion 
The construction industry is vital. The construction and maintainance of residential 
housing and public infraestructures is an indispensable component of any economy. 
And the construction sector is important in its own right, accounting for a sizeable share 
of a country’s output and employment. According to the European Commission (2013), 
the sector in Europe account for almost 10% of European Union GDP and 20 million 
direct jobs with comparable figures reported for OECD countries (OECD 2008). This 
may be one reason why policymakers aim to promote the development of this industry. 
A case in point is Construction 2020, an action plan adopted by the European 
Commission to promote the sector by way of more favourable investment conditions, 
human capital improvements, better resource efficiency, environmental performance 
and business opportunities, and strengthening of the internal market for construction 
and the global competitive position of EU construction enterprises (European 
Commission 2014). 
In this article we have argued that because the construction sector is characterized by 
potentially large rents and government intervention, it may contribute towards public 
sector malfeasance. Our empirical evidence, based on a sample of 42 countries over the 
period 1995 to 2011 and accounting for both the confounding effect of other variables 
and the possibility that corrupt officials may favor the development of the construction 
sector, provides robust support for the negative impact of construction on control of 
corruption. As such it supports calls to adopt anti-corruption measures in this industry at 
the same time as it recognizes that public officials in corrupt countries may tend to resist 
policies that reduce their access to rents (see, Transparency International (2011) for a 
review of initiatives and Le et al. (2014) for anti-corruption strategies).  
Our evidence is consistent with that reporting a deleterious effect on governance coming 
from another economic sector characterized by substantial rents and state involvement – 
the natural resource sector. That literature has, moreover, reported evidence of a 
resource curse whereby the abundance of natural resources has a negative impact on 
economic growth both directly because it makes countries susceptible to the Dutch 
Disease crowding out other sectors (Sachs and Warner 1995; Leite and Weidmann 
2002) but also indirectly, through its negative effect on governance (Isham et al. 2005, 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013). Our analysis is silent on the direct effect of the 
construction sector on growth rates (see, for example, Wilhemsson and Wigren 2011) 
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but it is suggestive of an indirect negative effect passing through its harmful effect on 
governance. We leave it for future research efforts to fully explore this important issue.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1 List of countries 
Country Code Country 
AUS Australia 
AUT Austria 
BEL Belgium 
BRA Brazil 
BGR Bulgaria 
CAN Canada 
CYP Cyprus 
CZE Czech Republic 
DNK Denmark 
EST Estonia 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
DEU Germany 
GRC Greece 
HUN Hungary 
ISL Iceland 
IND India 
IDN Indonesia 
IRL Ireland 
ITA Italy 
JPN Japan 
KOR Korea, Republic of 
LVA Latvia 
LTU Lithuania 
LUX Luxembourg 
MLT Malta 
MEX Mexico 
NLD Netherlands 
NZL New Zealand 
NOR Norway 
POL Poland 
PRT Portugal 
ROU Romania 
RUS Russia 
SVK Slovak Republic 
SVN Slovenia 
ESP Spain 
SWE Sweden 
CHE Switzerland 
TUR Turkey 
GBR United Kingdom 
USA United States 
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Table A.2 Summary statistics  
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
Control of Corruption (WDI) Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.0824 0.9627 
0.9797 
0.1610 
-1.1339 
-0.9182 
0.2253 
2.5856 
2.4494 
1.8143 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Corruption (ICRG) Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.7333 1.3288 
1.2309 
0.5037 
1 
1.2692 
2.2813 
6 
6 
5.8743 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Construction Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.3201 1.6193 
1.3001 
0.9919 
3.3935 
3.9888 
2.5417 
12.1715 
9.9559 
10.4132 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Population between 25 and 49 
years 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
36.3164 1.878572 
1.759675 
.9172818 
30.334 
31.17833 
33.22331 
42.312 
41.72646 
40.172 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of GDP Overall 
Between 
Within 
12.5335 1.6923 
1.7331 
0.1354 
8.8589 
9.0025 
11.989 
16.3977 
16.3486 
12.9787 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of GDP per capita Overall 
Between 
Within 
9.9592 0.6667 
0.6727 
0.1216 
7.4180 
7.7798 
9.4034 
11.0484 
10.9679 
10.3150 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of Population Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.5743 1.8129 
1.8765 
0.0324 
1.2888 
1.2051 
2.4435 
7.1104 
7.0209 
2.6695 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Public Sector Size  Overall 
Between 
Within 
34.3938 13.0572 
12.4831 
5.8327 
9.9236 
12.3065 
0.8256 
99.000 
74.1870 
68.9271 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Natural Resources Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.3521 3.2090 
3.3060 
0.6979 
0 
0 
1.9322 
19.9332 
16.6884 
4.8411 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Openness Overall 
Between 
Within 
92.5818 50.4575 
50.9919 
10.6794 
15.8650 
24.5443 
45.7050 
333.5322 
295.4356 
130.6784 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
31.5879 6.2676 
6.5437 
1.3584 
20.7933 
23.5389 
26.0799 
53.2056 
49.5488 
36.1348 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Fiscal Decentralization Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.5970 0.2149 
0.2178 
 
0.1000 
0.1000 
 
0.9600 
0.9600 
 
N = 42 
n = 42 
T = 1 
Political Decentralization Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.6821 0.1313 
0.1378 
 
0.4200 
0.4200 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 42 
n = 42 
T = 1 
Decentralization Index Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.3940 7.0572 
7.0548 
 
0.0100 
0.0100 
 
34 
34 
 
N = 42 
n = 42  
T = 1 
Catholic Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.3767 0.3526 
0.3613 
 
0 
0 
 
0.9447 
0.9447 
 
N = 42 
n = 42  
T = 1 
Protestant Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.2462 0.2788 
0.2779 
 
0.0017 
0.0017 
 
0.9304 
0.9304 
 
N = 42 
n = 42 
T = 1 
Muslim Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.0392 0.1177 
0.1686 
 
0.0001 
0.0001 
 
0.9713 
0.9713 
 
N = 42 
n = 42 
T = 1 
Orthodox Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.1054 0.2439 
0.2405 
 
0 
0 
 
0.9118 
0.9118 
 
N = 42 
n = 42 
T = 1 
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Table A.3 Correlation matrix 
 Control of 
Corruption 
(WDI) 
Corruption 
(ICRG) 
Construction 
as a % GVA 
Population 
25_49 
(Log of 
GDP) 
*construction 
Log of 
GDP per 
capita 
Log of 
population 
Public 
Sector Size 
Natural 
resources 
Openness Inequality 
Fiscal 
decentraliza
tion 
Political 
decentraliza
tion 
Control of Corruption (WDI) 1.000             
Corruption (ICRG) 0.8698 1.000            
Construction as % of GVA -0.191 -0.203 1.000           
Population 25_49 0.0454 -0.1151 0.2353 1.000          
(Log of GDP) *construction -0.107 -0.120 -0.021 0.2587 1.000         
Log of GDP per capita  0.792 0.583 -0.158 0.3056 -0.040 1.000        
Log of population -0.362 -0.295 -0.093 -0.0695 0.929 -0.381 1.000       
Public Sector Size 0.183 0.194 -0.143 -0.0295 -0.478 0.228 -0.498 1.000      
Natural resources -0.228 -0.113 -0.112 -0.0400 0.229 -0.137 0.273 -0.260 1.000     
Openness 0.116 0.052 -0.024 0.1530 -0.620 0.241 -0.651 0.310 -0.264 1.000    
Inequality -0.581 -0.458 0.095 -0.2043 0.427 -0.638 0.609 -0.408 0.284 -0.446 1.000   
Fiscal decentralization 0.503 0.462 -0.161 0.1191 0.304 0.394 0.154 -0.353 -0.013 -0.175 -0.185 1.000  
Political decentralization -0.023 -0.045 -0.160 0.1186 0.266 0.099 0.227 -0.160 -0.039 -0.321 0.191 0.219 1.000 
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Table A.4 Data definitions and sources  
 
Control of Corruption - WBGI Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (World Governance Indicators, World Bank).  
Control of Corruption- ICRG Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk 
Services Group).  
Construction Gross value added of the construction sector divided by total gross value added 
(World Input-Output Database Socio-economic Accounts (WIOD SEA) and 
OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis (ISIC Rev. 3)). 
GDP Real GDP in logs Penn World Table 8.0 database (RGDPNA, 2005 PPP$). 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in logs Penn World Table 8.0 database (RGDPCNA, 2005 
PPP$). 
Population 
Population 25-49 
Total population (Word Development Indicators, World Bank). 
Percentage of total population by broad age group, both sexes per 100 total 
population. (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision). 
Government Size Government consumption as a percentage of GDP at current PPPs (Penn World 
Tables, Version 8.0). 
Natural Resources Sum of Oil and Mineral Rents (World Development Indicators). 
Openess Percentage of exports plus imports divided by Real GDP (World Penn Tables).  
Inequality Gini coefficient based on net income inequality (Solt 2014). 
Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal autonomy of local governments measured by the extent that they are 
independent from higher level funds, tax, expenditure and borrowing autonomy 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014).   
Political Decentralization Election of mayor and local council members and direct democracy provisions 
for major tax, spending and regulatory decision and the recall of public officials 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014). 
Decentralization Index Fiscal and political decentralization plus information on the degree of 
administrative autonomy and the security of existence of local governments 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014).  
Legal Origins Dummy variables which identify the legal origin of the company law or 
commercial code of each country. There are five dummies: (1) English common 
law; (2) French commercial code; (3) German commercial code; (4) 
Scandinavian commercial code; (5) socialist communist laws (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
Religion Largest religions (Catholic, Protestants, Muslim and Eastern Orthodox) as a 
percentage of population in 2000 (North et al. 2013). 
 
